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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL P. REAM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID L. FITZEN, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 




PAUL REAM and BANK OF SALT LAKE, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Respondents, 
REAM Is BARGAIN ANNEX NO. 2, ) 
INCORPORATED, a Utah 
corporation, ) 
Defendant. 
Case No. 15220 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ~lATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant David L. Fitzen has appealed from a judgment 
of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge, on a suit initiated by respondent 
for an accounting in which the trial court determined that 
respondent was liable to the appellant in the sum of $106.03 as a 
result of a joint venture between the respondent and appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondent Daniel P. Ream, plaintiff below, filed suit 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District against the 
defendant and appellant David L. Fitzen based upon a joint venture 
activity of appellant and respondent. The appellant, defendant 
below, filed an answer and counterclaim against respondent Daniel P. 
Ream and an impleader action against Paul Ream and the Bank of 
Salt Lake bringing the impleader parties before the Court as 
counterclaim defendants. A reply was duly filed to the counter-
claim denying liability and an amended counterclaim and reply 
were subsequently filed. i'Jon-jury trial was held in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Third Judicial District, before the 
Honorable Stewart H. Hanson, Jr., Judge, and on January 18, 1977 
Judge Hanson rendered a memorandum opinion and findings of fact 
and judgment were duly entered dismissing the respondent Ream's 
complaint against the appellant Fitzen and granting Fitzen judgment 
on his counterclaim in the amount of $106.03. The appellant 
Fitzen has taken the appeal from that judgment. 
STATEHENT OF FACTS 
The complaint filed by Ream against Fitzen in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, in October 1975, alleged 
a joint venture agreement between Ream and Fitzen. The agreement 
was attached as Exhibit A to respondent's complaint and it is 
undisputed that the agreement was executed by Fitzen and Ream on 
the 7th day of October, 1974. ~he agreement was a joint venture 
agreement for the purchase of a 197!+ IJhi te truck to be used bv thP 
-2-
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parties in a joint venture known as the Fitzen-Ream Equipment Company. 
The joint venture agreement was supplemented on December 27, 1974, 
to cover an additional equipment item, to-wit: A Traxacavator. The 
joint venture agreement provided for a purchase price of the truck 
of approximately $33,017.25 with a 86,000 down payment. Daniel Ream 
contributed $6,000 cash and Fitzen contributed $2,000 cash and a 
truck bed set at a value of $4,000. Paragraph 5 of the agreement 
provided: 
'~11 expenses of the joint venture, including 
installment payments for said truck, repairs, and 
alterations, all licenses, taxes, insurance, and 
other expenses whatsoever in respect of the same, 
allowance to the joint venturers for driving said 
truck, and the wages of all persons employed in 
the said business, and all other moneys which become 
payable on the account of the said business and all 
losses which shall happen in the same shall be paid 
out of the capital of the partnership and/or the 
profits arising therefrom, or, if the same shall 
be deficient, by the joint ventures in equal shares." 
Paragraph 7 of the agreement provided: 
"It is agreed that David Fitzen is hereby 
designated as managing joint venturer and is 
given the sole direction and control of said 
truck throughout the duration of this joint 
venture. (In all other matters, each of the 
joint venturers shall have an equal interest 
in the conduct of the affairs of the joint 
venture.)" 
The agreement also provided in Paragraph 11 that the parties 
understood that appellant Fitzen conducted a demolition business 
under the name of Bonneville Hrecking CoT!lpany. The joint venture 
\·las separate and apart from Bonneville Hrecking Company for the 
purposes of the relationship between Ream and Fitzen. Paragraph 11 
Jf the joint venture agreement also provided that Bonneville Wrecking 
l'nrnpany could "from time to time rent equipment from or otherwise 
cuntracl with this joint venture." Paragraph 12 of the joint 
-3-
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venture agreement provided for the keeping of books and accounts 
and provided that the books would be kept at the principal place of 
business in Salt Lake City. A joint venture agreement '"as subse-
quently terminated and on August 11, 1975, Fitzen sent a letter to 
Ream purporting to terminate the joint venture in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff's complaint alleged a failure 
on the part of the defendant Fitzen who kept the books to keep 
adequate books and records and sought punitive damages, actual 
damages, and a full and complete accounting. The answer of Fitzen 
acknowledged the agreement and counterclaimed alleging misconduct 
on the part of respondent and asking the court for an accounting 
of the respective liability and interests of the parties in the 
joint venture. Fitzen also joined Paul Ream and the Bank of Salt 
Lake contending that a $6,000 lien that counterclaim defendant 
Paul Ream had on the property of the joint venture should be 
declared null and void. An amended counterclaim was duly filed 
challenging Paul Ream's lien in the sum of $6,000 on the truck 
which was the subject of the joint venture. The interest of the 
Bank of Salt Lake was as the lender of funds necessary to purchase 
the truck by appellant and respondent. 
Fitzen testified that he did set up books for the venture 
"after a fashion." (Plaintiff's Abstract p. 1 ) . A separate 
checking account was set up in the name of Fitzen and Ream. 
(Plaintiff's Abstract p. 1 ) . Fitzen further testified that he 
never set up a ledger for the joint venture and freouentlv jobs 
on which the truck was used were bid in the name of Bonneville 
Wrecking Company (Plaintiff's Abstract p. l ) and monies were put 
-4-
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into the Bonneville Hrecking account on a regular basis rather 
than the joint venture account. (Plaintiff's Abstract p. 3 ) . 
At the time of trial, appellant offered the testimony of 
Gerald Ernest Deters, an accountant, retained to do a summary of 
the Bonneville Hrecking account to ascertain what items of Bonneville 
',)reeking and other receipts of transactions were attributable to 
the Fitzen-Ream joint venture activity. Deters testified that he 
used the Fitzen-Ream checkbook in an effort to put together an 
accounting or audit. He based his accounting on information 
supplied by Fitzen (Abstract p. 9-10) including figures supplied 
by Fi tzen. (Abstract p. 15 ) . All invoices and documents were 
not made available. Exhibit 17F, being the accounting summary 
that Fitzen offered to prove his claim, was admitted only for the 
purposes of a showing and accounting but not for the truth of the 
matter stated. Respondent's objection to the substance of Fitzen's 
accounting was sustained. It appeared that Fitzen regularly used 
the Bonneville Wrecking account and the Ream-Fitzen account for 
his own business interests in Bonneville l-Jrecking. (Abstract p. 3=Li). 
Exhibits 18 through 23 being the underlying documents upon which 
Deter's reconstruction of the obligations between Fitzen and Ream 
were not received by the court except for illustrative purposes 
and the court indicated that if the trial were a jury trial an 
objection raised by respondent on the basis of hearsay would be 
sustained. (Abstract p. 53). Based upon the evidence before the 
court, Judge Hanson entered his memorandum decision setting the 
2ccounting between the parties as follows: 
-5-
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Judge Hanson further found that each of the parties contributed 
$13,000 towards the joint venture, some in cash and some in 
equipment. He found that Fitzen was the managing partner of the 
joint venture and carried most of the income and expenses of the 
joint venture by himself or his company Bonneville Hrecking. The 
court found "that [Fitzen] did not keep a proper and exact accounting 
with respect to the income and expenses." The court further found 
in Paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact that Daniel Ream worked 
for the joint venture and that the joint venture as a result owed 
Daniel Ream $2,807.50. The court found that Fitzen used the 
truck and tractor of the joint venture in connection with Fitzen's 
business as Bonneville Hrecking Company and owed the joint venture 
the sum of $22,483.00 for the rental of the equipment. (Findings of 
Fact, 5). The court found that Fitzen had ratified the securitv 
interest of Paul Ream in the loan of the money to obtain the 
-6-
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tractor (Findings of Fact , 6) and that Fitzen had not met his 
burden of proof or persuasion as to claimed loss or damage to the 
tractor or other claimed losses or that the claims were unrelated 
to rent to Bonneville Wrecking. (Findings of Fact ~Ill 7 and 8). 
Based upon the Findings of Fact, the court entered judgment for 
the defendant Fitzen on Fitzen's counterclaim. 
POil~T I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CHARGING THE DEFENDANT FITZEc·l 
HITH RENT NOR IN FAILING TO CREDIT FITZEll TrJITH FUNDS DEPOSITED 
IN THE JOINT VENTURE ACCOUNT. 
The instant action filed by respondent Daniel P. Ream was 
for an accounting from the managing partner, David L. Fitzen. 
Punitive damages were sought in the action but not pursued or 
awarded. The counterclaim of the defendant was a claim for 
offsets and consequently the action was an accounting action with 
a resulting judgment based upon accounts which could be reconstructed. 
Although the action is equitable in nature, the findings of the 
trial court are entitled to substantial and special consideration. 
In Bear River State Bank v. Merrill, 101 Utah 176, 120 P.2d 325 
(1941), an action was filed by plaintiffs against defendants, 
former officers and directors of a bank, for conversion and for 
an accounting. This Court stated: 
"The findings of the trial court will not be 
upset. This court recognizes the fact that the 
trial court saw the \.Jitnesses, observed their 
demeanor and was in a better position to judge 
their cr~dibility than is an appellate court with 
only the transcript as a basis for its conclusions. 
It is the duty of this court to review and weigh 
the evidence in an action for legal and equitable 
relief and the findings of the trial court are not 
disturbed unless wrong. Rich v. Ste~hens, 79 Utah 
4ll, ll P.2d 295; Smith v. Edwards, 1 Utah 244, 
-7-
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17 P.2d 264. And where it is claimed that the 
facts found by the trial court are not supported by 
the evidence the appellants are entitled to a full 
review of the evidence and a determination by the 
Supreme Court. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 43 P.2d 
513, 101 A.L.R. 532; Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526 
46 P.2d 674. However, findings based upon conflicting' 
testimony such as is presented in the instant case, 
will not be disturbed unless it appears that the trial 
court has misapplied proven facts or that the findings 
are clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
Recently, in Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976), the 
Court observed: 
"Even though it is true, as plaintiffs advocate: 
that the attempt to reform a deed is a proceeding in 
equity in which the court may review the facts, it is 
nevertheless well established that because of the 
advantaged position of the trial court, we give 
considerable deference to his findings and judgment." 
And, in Elias v. Lea, P.2d (Utah 1978), in an equity proceeding 
the Court observed: 
"The appellants urge us to overlook the finding 
of the trial court who saw and heard the witnesses 
and render our own findings at variance therewith. 
They urge us to do so because of the provisions of 
Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
which so far as material, reads as follows: 
... In equity cases the appeal may 
be on questions of both law and fact; in 
cases at law the appeal shall be on questions 
of law alone. 
At the time the Constitution was adopted, equity 
matters were submitted on depositions; therefore, 
members of the Supreme Court were just as capable 
of determining the facts in an equity case as was 
the trial judge. By our court decision we have 
continued to consider the facts of an equity case 
on appeal, but we do not substitute our judgment 
of what the facts are unless the ruling of the court 
below is clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
Consequently, there is no basis for overturning the trial court's 
judgment unless the facts found by the trial judge are clearlv 
unsupported by the evidence or the judgment legally erroneous. 
-3-
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In an accounting action it is incumbent upon the party 
against whom the accounting is sought to provide as full and 
accurate a picture of the status of the account as is possible. 
The burden in this case is therefore upon Fitzen. In Dunn v. 
Baugh, 506 P.2d 463 (Idaho 1973), the court stated: 
"Baugh, as the party called upon to render 
an accounting, had both the burden of pro-
ducing evidence and the burden of persuasion." 
Fitzen's accounting (Exhibit 17F) was not admitted into evidence 
for anything other than the fact of accounting, as distinct from 
the truth of the matters asserted, and the underlying documents 
which Fitzen used to support his accounting were also deemed 
hearsay. Thus, the only significant evidence Fitzen presented 
on the accounting was not received for the truth of the matter 
asserted and therefore did not establish Fitzen's contentions as 
to the status of the relationship between the parties. Fitzen 
simply did not account even though he was the managing party in 
the joint venture. He had the records and the accounts and 
comingled the activities of the Ream-Fitzen joint venture with 
those of Bonneville Wrecking, his own personal business. He was 
unable to render an accurate accounting. In Simper v. Scorup, 78 
Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941 (1931), this Court said with reference to the 
burden on a party in an accounting action: 
"From the accounting rendered by Scorup and 
from the bank statements upon which his accounting 
is wholly based, we do not see how any even 
reasonably accurate result may be reached as to 
the value of the relative interests of the parties 
at the time of the fire. The accounting rendered 
by him was a mere general statement or accounting 
with no explanation given of it other than as 
stated. In a suit in accounting in equity the 
burden of proof is upon the defendant to account 
for all money or property of the plaintiff that 
-9-
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has come into his hands. He has the burden of 
showing that he is entitled to credit for moneys 
charged in his account or as having been paid by 
him to or for the use of the plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff does not have the burden of showing that 
the items charged were improper or that the 
defendant was not entitled thereto. The defendant 
as the trustee of the plaintiff was required to 
show that he had performed his trust and the 
manner of its performance. He owed that duty 
because of his confidential relation and because 
he is presumed to know how he performed his duty." 
Fitzen did not carry forward his legal duty. His testimony given 
as to the status of the accounts was that he had no personal 
information, commingled the accounts, failed to keep adequate 
records and vouchers, and was unable to present any reasonable 
evidence to justify his claim for relief. He set up records and 
accounts "after a fashion". Fitzen does not in this appeal, 
contend the trial court erred in not receiving his accounting 
into evidence. Therefore, his exhibits are not properly considered 
for purposes of this appeal. A joint venture is a business 
association distinguishable from a partnership only by the narrowness 
of its purpose. Otherwise the legal relationship is similar to a 
partnership arrangement. Crane & Bromberg, Law of Partnership, 
p. 189. Fitzen used the joint venture equipment in conjunction 
with Fitzen's personal business activities. Under the term of the 
joint venture agreement, he was chargeable for the reasonable 
rental for the equipment use. Whether any sum was ever received 
by the joint venture from the rental of the equipment is not 
material. The fact is the value of the rental is chargeable to 
Fitzen. There is sufficient evidence in the record as pointed 
out in appellant's own brief to establish a rental figure for 
Fitzen's use of the joint venture property in conjunction with 
-10-
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his own Bonneville Wrecking business. The accounting information 
the court relied upon was based upon information presented by the 
respondent Dan Ream not rebutted by Fitzen. The trial court 
accepted the evidence of Daniel Ream. In addition, Fitzen was 
unable to establish the right to have the Ream-Fitzen account 
figures credited to the joint venture since he was unaware of 
just what monies were deposited in the account and how they were 
disbursed. He was unable to allocate funds to transactions. 
He simply did not meet his burden of proof with reference to the 
accounting. With reference to alleged losses occasioned by Ream's 
efforts on various projects no evidence was presented which would 
establish any special culpability on his part such that he was 
legally chargeable for any special losses. In the absence of 
fraud, culpable negligence, or bad faith as to acts performed by 
Ream, the joint venture had to bear the loss and Fitzen was 
entitled to no credit for those matters. 68 C.J.S. Partnership, 
§ 97. Further, the trial court found that as to such special 
claims that Fitzen had not carried his burden of proof. Although 
the joint venture agreement contemplated that Fitzen would rent 
the joint venture equipment and in fact Fitzen admittedly used 
the equipment and kept the books this did not excuse him from 
keeping accurate accounts. Fitzen was still required to exercise 
honest, accurate and forthright method of accounting. The obser-
vations of Justice Cardozo in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 
164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) are applicable in this case. It was 
observed there: 
"Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe 
to one another ... the duty of finest loyalty. 
nany furms of conduct permissible in a workaday 
world for those acting at arm's length, are 
-11-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization p ovided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. 
A trustee is held to something stricter than 
the morals of the market place. !lot honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive is then the standard of behavior. 
As to this there has developed a tradition that 
is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising 
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of 
equity when petitioned to undermine the rule 
of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating 
erosion' of particular exceptions ... Only 
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries 
been kept at a level higher than that trodden 
by the crowd. It will not consciously be 
lowered by any judgment of this court." 
In Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U.S. 524, 541 (1893), it was observed wi~ 
reference to the accountability of a partner: 
"It is 'well settled that one partner cannot, 
directly or indirectly, use partnership assets 
for his own benefit; that he cannot in conducting 
the business of a partnership, take any profit 
clandestinely for himself; that he cannot carry 
on the business of the partnership for his 
private advantage; that he cannot carry on another 
business in competition or rivalry with that of the 
firm, thereby depriving it of the benefit of his 
time, skill, and fidelity, without being accountable 
to his copartners for any profit that may accrue 
to him therefrom; that he cannot be permitted to 
secure for himself that which it is his duty to 
obyain, if at all, for the firm of which he is a 
member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge or 
information which may be properly regarded as the 
property of the partnership, in the sense that 
it is available or useful to the firm for any 
purpose within the scope of the partnership 
business." 
Fitzen simply did not carry his burden of proof in the trial 
court by showing that he was entitled to any benefits other than 
accorded him by the trial judge. His proffers of proof were 
either inadmissible or did not establish contentions he now seeks 
to support on appeal. The trial court had the advantage of observf 
the witnesses and of being able to judge their credibility. lie 
simply accepted the evidence that appeared reasonable and rejected 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the exhibits and testimony that was speculative. Fitzen's evidence 
as seen from respondent's abstract was speculative, inexact, and 
hypothetical. There is believable evidence to support the 
rental figure the trial court imposed on Fitzen, the other figures 
adopted by the trial court, as well as justification for not 
affording Fitzen any additional credits. In Tanner v. Utah Poultry 
& Farmers Cooperative, 15 Utah 2d 145, 389 P.2d 62 (1964), this 
Court had before it an accounting action involving some 1200 
pages of record. The court affirmed the trial court finding 
adverse to the appellant noting: 
"The points made on appeal, asserting in substance 
that the trial court erred in its findings, are not 
supported by the evidence or any conclusion that 
the trial court acted arbitrarily. We believe 
and hold that the court properly, reasonably and 
justifiably arrived at its conclusion, and that 
there is no meritorious reason why this court 
should burden the reader with any detailed canvass 
of either the testimony or the exhibits proffered." 
This case warrants a similar result. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE $6,000 LIEN ON JOINT 
VENTURE PROPERTY TO PAUL REAH HAS KNOWN AND RATIFIED BY 
FITZEN PRIOR TO THE SECURITY INTEREST ATTACHED IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD AND NOT CONTRAVENED BY THE ABSTRACT ON APPEAL. 
The facts supporting the finding No. 6 of the trial court as 
to ratification by Fitzen of the lien in favor of Paul Ream and 
Bank of Salt Lake on joint venture property is fully supported by 
the record. The brief of the Bank of Salt Lake City adequately 
covers this issue. Further, the abstract of the record prepared 
by appellant pursuant to Rule 75E does not set forth a sufficient 
factual basis justifying this court on appeal from concluding that 
the tri a1 court's finding \vas correct. Therefore, it must be assu.r'led 
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that the finding of the trial court was supported by the evidence. 
Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963). 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REDUCE DAN REAM'S 
EQUITY BY THE AMOUNT OF THE $6,000 LIEN OF PAUL REA:'I1 
SINCE THE LIEN WAS RATIFIED BY APPELLANT AND WAS OHLY 
A SECURITY INTEREST APPLICABLE TO THE ASSETS OF THE 
JOINT VENTURE IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT. 
The appellant Fitzen contends that if the lien on the joint 
venture equipment is valid that there should be a $6,000 reduction 
(amount of lien) in Dan Ream's equity in the joint venture. The 
accounting action was to resolve the interests between the parties 
in relation to the joint venture. Fitzen ratified the security 
interest of Paul Ream and the Bank of Salt Lake. Appellant's 
abstract of the record does not provide a basis for a conclusion 
contrary to that finding of the trial court that ratification 
occurred before the security interest attached. Consequently, 
the contribution of Ream was accepted by Fitzen subject to the 
security interest. The security interest became operable between 
the parties, ?OA-9-201, U.C.A. 1953. It defeated the joint 
venture's interest in the full value of the asset only upon 
default, ?OA-9-501, U.C.A., 1953. Upon the lien becoming operable 
in favor of the secured creditor the assets of the joint venture 
would be reduced, but the original contribution of the parties 
to the joint venture would not be effected. Thus at the time of 
the joint venture the contribution of Ream was the face value of 
the asset, $6,000, and in an accounting he would be entitled to 
credit for his contribution. Any loss, and no loss has as vet been 
shown, is the loss of the joint venture and not of consequence in 
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an accounting between the parties. Further, any loss is at best 
speculative. Such a determination would be purely speculative, 
dependent upon matters outside the record of this case. Therefore, 
it was proper to accord Daniel Ream the value of his initial 
contribution in an accounting between Ream and Fitzen and Fitzen 
is not entitled to a credit for the lien. 
The respondent further submits that the position taken on this 
point by the appellant is not shown in the record to have been raised 
in the court below and therefore was not property preserved on appeal. 
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 
(Utah 1975); Hamilton v. Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d 
235 (1964) 0 
POlin IV 
APPELLANT'S ABSTRACT OF THE RECORD PURSUANT TO RULE 75(e) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A REVIEW OF APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL. 
This Court directed that in view of the length of the record 
that an abstract be prepared pursuant to Rule 75(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The abstract as prepared by the appellant in 
support of appellant's contentions is not sufficient for review 
by this Court of the issues asserted by the appellant on appeal. 
The abstract does not present evidence sufficient to warrant the 
relief granted. An abstract should present to the appellate 
court an accurate and authentic history of all proceedings in the 
trial below and a correct and sufficient summary of >vhat transpired. 
Brown v. Reichmann, 237 '1o. App. 136, 164 S.vJ.2d 201 (1942). 
There the abstract does not support the appellant's contentions 
it will not justify an appellate court in according the relief 
requested. !larding v. Bedoll, 202 '1o 625, 100 S.H. 638 (1907). 
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Consequently, this court should follow its prior rulings and 
presume the findings of the trial court to be supported by 
admissible, competent and substantial evidence and affirm the 
judgment. Watkins v. Simonds, supra; Sayeers v. Sayeers, 558 
P.2d 607 (1976); Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 542 P.2d 183 (Utah 
1975); Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 155, 193 P. 1093, 15 
A.L.R. 620 (1920); In re Voorhees Est., 12 Utah 2d 361, 366, 366 
P.2d 977 (1961); James Mfg. Co. v. Hilson, 15 Utah 2d 210, 213, 
390 P.2d 127 (1964); Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 212 Utah 359, 242 
P.2d 297 (1952); Felter v. Felter, 
22' 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
p. 2d. (Utah, February 
It is respectfully submitted that there is ample basis in the 
record before this court to warrant this court in concluding that 
the findings and judgment of the trial court were legally sufficient 
and should be affirmed. The appellant did not carry its burden in 
the trial court. The facts which the trial court found supportable 
by the evidence, the record on appeal does not justify departing 
from the trial court's findings of fact which were based upon the 
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